

Need is a purely biological instinct, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other love. Hence demand soon takes on double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287)

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It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives; see S11, 243). There is only one object of desire, objet petit a, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The objet petit a is not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a lack. (50 分)

--Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*, p.37.

One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological sample within a restricted geographical area – European culture since the sixteenth century – one can be certain that man is a recent invention within it. It is not around him and his secrets that knowledge prowled for so long in the darkness. In fact, among all the mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and their order, the knowledge of identities, differences, characters, equivalences, words – in short, in the midst of all the episodes of that profound history of the *Same* – only one, that which began a century and a half ago and is now perhaps drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man to appear. And that appearance was not the liberation of an old anxiety, the transition into luminous consciousness of an age-old concern, the entry into objectivity of something that had long remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies: it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. (50 分)

- Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Vintage Books, 1973, 386-387.

## 哲學基本問題試題

- 一、 由於知識論指的是主體對客體的認知，故追求知識與現實的一致性一向被認為是哲學反省的目的，即便是懷疑主義亦不外此前提假設。可是，在精神分析中，這種一致性並不存在；相反的，他們認為現實是創傷的、不實的。唯獨如此，精神分析才有可能。試問這是什麼意思？在這種看待方式下，精神分析作為一種哲學又是怎麼可能的？（25分）
- 二、 一般以為康德倫理學是一種形式主義，缺乏具體歷史處境的佐證，但紀傑克（S. Žižek）認為，正因為形式上的空洞，才容有我願意負責的積極參與。而他的理由卻來自於黑格爾的普遍性之作為擾亂每個個別內容的否定（negative）力量。這是怎麼一回事？並且，若是如此的話，他又為什麼評論康德倫理學的內容是一種被壓抑的創傷？一個可能比積極的惡（radical evil）更加罪大惡極的窮兇惡極（diabolical evil）？若不明白紀傑克之運用拉崗（J. Lacan）的解法，可用康德與黑格爾哲學之間的理論關係試以推論出這個問題的意義。（25分）
- 三、 老子說：「天下皆知美之為美，斯惡已。」什麼是美？「美」與瞬間的感受之間有什麼樣的關係？請你先舉出你的論點或某位哲學家的美學理論來回答這個問題。（10%）波特萊爾（Charles Baudelaire）在《現代生活的畫家》這本書第四節〈現代性〉的一開始這樣說：「他就這樣走啊，跑啊，尋找啊。他尋找什麼？如我所描述的這個人，這個富有活躍的想像力的孤獨者，肯定有一個比純粹的漫遊者的目的更高的目的，有一個與一時的、短暫的愉快不同的更普遍的目的。他尋找我們可以稱為現代性(modernity)的那種東西，因為再沒有更好的詞來表達我們現在談的這種觀念了。對他來說，問題在於從流行的東西中提取出可能包含著在歷史中富有詩意的東西，從過渡中抽出永恆。」請你從上述文字中找出線索，闡述「現代性」與「美學」之間的理論關聯。（1）首先，請從哲學的角度來說明你所認為的「現代性」經驗具有什麼樣的美學基本特徵；（10%）（2）其次，請從理論的角度闡述「現代性」與當代生活世界感覺結構的實際景況有什麼具體關聯；（10%）（3）請至少舉出任何一種當代美學的學派（譬如：新馬克思學派、現象學、精神分析、結構主義、後結構思想等）、或是學派之間的爭論、或是個別哲學家的美學學說、或是哲學家之間的論爭作為例子來加以評論，呈現你自己對於這一個議題的理論觀點；（10%）（4）最後，請你統整你在前面的種種論述，回過頭來，從自己的觀點來評論老子第二章的第一句話：「天下皆知美之為美，斯惡已。」（10%）